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CLD-131        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-3265 
___________ 
 
ROGER ALLEN JOHNSON, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
EMELIA CAPUTO; DR. VICTORIA GRESSNER; DEBORAH WILSON;  
PRIME CARE MEDICAL, INC.; JASON ROSATI, Lt.; ROBERT MEYERS;  
MICHAEL BATEMAN; JOHN ROBINSON; CHRIS NAUGLE; NORTHAMPTON  
COUNTY PRISON 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(E.D. Pa. Civil No. 5-11-cv-02603) 
District Judge:  Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or  
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
February 22, 2018 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, GREENAWAY, JR., and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 11, 2018) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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PER CURIAM 
Pro se appellant Roger Johnson, proceeding in forma pauperis, appeals from the 
District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the five remaining defendants in 
an action Johnson brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  For the reasons that follow, we 
will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
I. 
Because we write primarily for the parties, we will only recite the facts necessary 
for our discussion; these facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.  On May 5, 2009, 
Johnson attempted to evade arrest by jumping from a balcony.  He fell thirty to forty feet 
onto a hard surface, sustaining fractures in both of his feet and his lower back.  Police 
escorted Johnson to a local hospital, where he underwent foot surgery.  Johnson was 
discharged to the Northampton County Prison (“NCP”) on May 14, 2009.  He claims that 
institutional and medical staff members violated his constitutional rights during his 
subsequent recovery period at NCP between May 2009 and September 2010.1 
Specifically, Johnson maintains that defendant Lieutenant Jason Rosati assaulted 
him on two occasions.  Next, he claims that defendants Dr. Victoria Gessner, Dr. 
Deborah Wilson, and R.N. Emilia Caputo were deliberately indifferent to his serious 
medical needs in denying him access to adequate pain medication and ambulatory 
                                              
1  Johnson was briefly released from NCP between February 23, 2010 and March 14, 
2010. 
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assistance equipment.2  He also generally alleges that they deliberately ignored medical 
grievances that he submitted and failed to coordinate external medical treatment for him.  
Finally, he contends that defendant PrimeCare Medical, Inc., a private medical services 
contractor, failed to properly train and supervise its employees, leading him to receive 
deficient medical care.3 
A. Defendant Rosati 
Johnson saw defendant Rosati daily while he was recovering in the medical 
housing unit between May 2009 and December 2009.  According to Johnson’s testimony 
at a 2014 deposition, on June 6, 2009, Rosati entered a common area where Johnson was 
sitting in a wheelchair watching television with other inmates.  Rosati was swinging a 
collapsible metal baton.  When Johnson commented that Rosati was carrying a weapon, 
Rosati hit his right foot with the baton and told him that that was what a weapon was for.  
Johnson experienced extreme pain when he was struck.  He could not tell if his foot had 
been injured from being struck.  In 2010, Johnson wrote a letter to a prison official about 
this incident, stating that Rosati struck him lightly, though hard enough to hurt, and that 
                                              
2  Johnson experienced numerous other medical issues while he was incarcerated; the 
record of his conditions and treatments is voluminous.  For example, Johnson alleges that 
he experienced an incident of severe abdominal pain in June 2010 and did not receive 
medical attention for this pain until several hours later.  A nurse who is not a party to this 
litigation examined him after he notified prison officials of his need for medical attention.  
As Johnson does not allege any defendant’s involvement in this incident, we need not 
discuss it further.  See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 
3  Johnson does not appeal the District Court’s grant of summary judgment for defendants 
on his negligent infliction of emotional distress claims. 
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he knew Rosati intended his actions “jokingly.” 
On August 6, 2009, Johnson was again sitting in a common area in his wheelchair 
watching television with other inmates when Rosati told him to remove a t-shirt that he 
was wearing around his head because it was not prison-issued clothing.  Johnson 
removed the t-shirt initially but put it back on when Rosati left.  Rosati returned to the 
common area, grabbed a broom, and hit Johnson in the left shoulder and upper arm with 
the straw part of the broom.  Johnson’s arm and shoulder were red and painful for up to 
half an hour after this incident.  It does not appear that Johnson sought medical attention 
after either incident, and there are no accounts of the witnesses to either event. 
B. Medical Defendants 
 The majority of Johnson’s claims concern the medical care that he received at 
NCP, specifically his access to pain medication and assistive ambulatory equipment.  His 
NCP medical record indicates that he received pain medication every day that he was 
incarcerated, except for on February 10, 2010, when he refused his pain medication.  
Johnson provided conflicting testimony in a deposition about whether or not he had 
received pain medication on all of these days, particularly immediately after his surgery, 
but he maintains that his pain medication was frequently insufficient for the level of pain 
he experienced.  He believes that his NCP medical records have been falsified. 
 Johnson received Percocet while he was in the hospital before his detention at 
NCP.  Dr. Gessner prescribed alternate pain management medication for Johnson when 
he entered NCP, including Motrin, Tramadol, and Tylenol with codeine.  Gessner 
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testified that Johnson was somnolent when she first saw him after his transfer to the 
facility and she had determined that she could accomplish the same analgesic effect as 
Percocet with other medications, after assessing Johnson’s condition.  Dr. Wilson 
examined Johnson the day after his transfer and did not note any concerns from him 
about his pain medication regimen. 
Johnson repeatedly complained of pain in the first few weeks after he was 
admitted; staff responded by prescribing additional pain medication or increasing his 
doses of pain medication.  Johnson also submitted a grievance form in which he stated 
that the pain medication he received immediately after his surgery had been insufficient 
to manage his pain, causing him to suffer severe pain for weeks.  Prison staff received his 
grievance form on September 4, 2009 and Nurse Caputo responded to it.  The medical 
defendants’ expert submitted an opinion that Percocet is generally not used in the 
correctional setting and that correctional medical providers regularly substitute 
alternative medications for prescriptions received from external medical providers. 
When Johnson arrived at NCP, he was using a wheelchair because he could not 
bear weight on his feet.  In August 2009, his orthopedic surgeon instructed him to begin 
weight-bearing activity with a walker.  In December 2009, several NCP medical staff 
noted that Johnson was ambulating without the use of his wheelchair.  Dr. Gessner 
discontinued his wheelchair use on December 18, 2009 and issued him a walker instead.  
Johnson claims that he slipped and fell in the shower while using his walker later that 
day.  He was sent to the hospital for an elbow injury.  When Johnson returned to NCP, he 
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was placed on suicide watch due to concerns that he may injure himself.4 
On December 21, 2009, Johnson was transported to an external physical therapy 
provider for an evaluation.  Dr. Gessner determined on December 23, 2009 that Johnson 
was ambulating well enough that he no longer needed to use a walker, based on a 
consultation with his physical therapist.  Johnson was prescribed a cane after he requested 
one in January 2010, and eventually he was able to progress to walking without it most of 
the time.  The medical defendants’ expert submitted an opinion that Johnson’s wheelchair 
was discontinued at an appropriate time. 
Dr. Gessner cleared Johnson to leave the medical housing unit on December 23, 
on the condition that he would be transported up and down any steps with a specialized 
stair transport chair.  Johnson believes that he was prematurely transferred out of the 
medical unit for an incident that occurred earlier in December, where he was issued a 
misconduct report for acting aggressively and disrespectfully toward staff.  Johnson was 
dissatisfied with the location of his cell and his shower access after his transfer and filed a 
grievance form directed at PrimeCare; staff responded that PrimeCare had no control 
over cell assignments. 
In April 2011, Johnson filed a complaint against these defendants and numerous 
others.  The District Court dismissed Johnson’s claims against the majority of the 
                                              
4  The shower in the medical housing unit was equipped with accessibility features, 
including a shower chair.  A nurse noted that the shower floor was dry when she arrived 
to assist Johnson, and that Johnson was wearing slip-resistant shoes. 
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defendants early in the litigation but allowed him to pursue certain claims against 
defendants Rosati, Gessner, Wilson, Caputo, and PrimeCare.  They moved for summary 
judgment on Johnson’s remaining claims, which the District Court granted by order 
entered on September 29, 2017.  Johnson timely appealed. 
II. 
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise 
plenary review over a district court’s grant of summary judgment; thus, we apply the 
same standard as the district court.  Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 265 
(3d Cir. 2014).  We will “grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  A genuine dispute of material fact exists if there is 
sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.  
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 
In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, “all justifiable inferences are to be 
drawn in . . . favor” of the non-moving party.  Id. at 255.  However, a mere “scintilla of 
evidence” in support of the non-moving party does not create a genuine issue of material 
fact.  Id. at 252.  Additionally, “the non-movant may not rest on speculation and 
conjecture in opposing a motion for summary judgment.”  Ramara, Inc. v. Westfield Ins. 
Co., 814 F.3d 660, 666 (3d Cir. 2016).  We may summarily affirm a district court’s 
decision “on any basis supported by the record” if the appeal fails to present a substantial 
question.  See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
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III. 
 The District Court properly granted summary judgment to defendants on all of 
Johnson’s claims.  First, Johnson cannot establish an excessive force claim against 
Rosati.  The Eighth Amendment prohibits the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of 
pain” that violates “contemporary standards of decency.”  Hudson v. McMillian, 503 
U.S. 1, 8 (1992).  Courts evaluate several factors to determine whether a correctional 
officer has used excessive force, including: “(1) ‘the need for the application of force’; 
(2) ‘the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used’; (3) “the 
extent of injury inflicted’; (4) ‘the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as 
reasonably perceived by responsible officials on the basis of the facts known to them’; 
and (5) ‘any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.’”  Brooks v. 
Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 2000), quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 
(1986).  Thus, courts examine a correctional officer’s subjective motive for his or her 
conduct as well as the objective effect of that conduct. 
 Assuming Johnson’s account of the two incidents to be true, there is no evidence 
that the use of force was necessary in the first incident and scant evidence that force was 
necessary in the second.  Nevertheless, not “every malevolent touch by a prison guard 
gives rise to a federal cause of action.”  Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9.  De minimis uses of 
physical force are “necessarily exclude[d] from constitutional recognition,” as long as 
they are “not of a sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind.”  Id. at 9-10 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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The key inquiry is whether a prison official “maliciously and sadistically use[d] 
force to cause harm,” regardless of whether an inmate suffered a “significant injury.”  Id. 
at 9.  However, “the extent of injury suffered by an inmate . . . may suggest whether the 
use of force . . . evinced such wantonness with respect to the unjustified infliction of 
harm as is tantamount to a knowing willingness that it occur.”  Id. at 7.  Johnson testified 
that he felt pain on contact but could not identify any injury after the first incident and 
that his arm was red and painful for up to half an hour after the second incident.  In this 
case, Johnson’s de minimis injuries illustrate that the force allegedly utilized was also 
constitutionally de minimis.  See Brooks, 204 F.3d at 108.  Further, at least with respect 
to the first incident, Johnson himself perceived Rosati’s actions to be intended “jokingly” 
rather than “maliciously and sadistically.”  Considering the Whitley factors, no 
reasonable jury could find on this record that the force allegedly used by Rosati was “of a 
sort repugnant to the conscience of mankind” such that Johnson’s constitutional rights 
were violated.5 
Next, Johnson’s claims against all of the medical defendants lack merit.  The 
Supreme Court has held that “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of 
prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ . . . proscribed by 
the Eighth Amendment.”   Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).  Establishing a 
                                              
5  In his argument in support of his appeal, Johnson does not provide any reason that the 
District Court’s entry of summary judgment for Rosati was improper, although he 
presents numerous arguments for his claims against the other defendants. 
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claim requires proving both an objective component — “a serious medical need” — and a 
subjective component — “acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate 
indifference to that need.”  Natale v. Camden Cty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d 
Cir. 2003).  A plaintiff may show deliberate indifference by demonstrating that “there 
was objective evidence that [the] plaintiff had serious need for medical care . . . and 
prison officials ignored that evidence” or where “necessary medical treatment is delayed 
for non-medical reasons.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
“Where a prisoner has received some amount of medical treatment, it is difficult to 
establish deliberate indifference, because prison officials are afforded considerable 
latitude in the diagnosis and treatment of prisoners.”  Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 
227 (3d Cir. 2017).  “[M]ere negligent treatment or even medical malpractice do not 
trigger the protections of the Eighth Amendment.”  Id.  “Where a prisoner has received 
some medical attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment, federal 
courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize 
claims which sound in state tort law.”  Id. at 228.  However, prison officials may not 
provide “an easier and less efficacious treatment” of an inmate’s medical condition with 
deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.  West v. Keve, 571 F.2d 158, 162 (3d 
Cir. 1978). 
Additionally, “[a] defendant in a civil rights action must have personal 
involvement in the alleged wrongs.”  Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 
1988).  Johnson may establish personal involvement by demonstrating “personal 
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direction or . . . actual knowledge and acquiescence,” which must be shown “with 
appropriate particularity.”  See id. 
Dr. Gessner was substantially involved with Johnson’s recovery from his May 
2009 surgeries.  She prescribed him medications on numerous occasions and oversaw his 
transition from using a wheelchair to walking independently.  The record demonstrates 
that whenever Dr. Gessner was notified about Johnson’s complaints of pain, she either 
prescribed additional doses of pain medication or added pain medications to those that he 
was already taking.  Johnson may have disagreed with the specific medications he 
received, but “[d]eference is given to prison medical authorities in the diagnosis and 
treatment of patients, and courts ‘disavow any attempt to second-guess the propriety or 
adequacy of a particular course of treatment . . . [which] remains a question of sound 
professional judgment.’”  See Palakovic, 854 F.3d at 227-28, quoting Inmates of 
Allegheny Cty. Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979). 
 Similarly, Dr. Gessner transitioned Johnson from a wheelchair to a walker months 
after his orthopedic surgeon recommended it, after observing him personally and seeing 
notes from other medical staff indicating his improved ambulation over time.  Johnson’s 
transition off the walker was based on Dr. Gessner’s consultation with his physical 
therapist.  Johnson’s “mere disagreement as to the proper medical treatment” does not 
establish a claim of deliberate indifference.  See Monmouth Cty. Corr. Institutional 
Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d Cir. 1987).  Johnson does not connect Dr. 
Gessner to his fall in the shower after he began using the walker; the record contains 
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conflicting evidence about the event, but even under Johnson’s account, it was apparently 
an accident. 
Johnson has repeatedly admitted that defendant Wilson had no knowledge of any 
of his requests for pain medication or for assistive ambulatory equipment.  Caputo’s only 
relevant connection to his claims involves her response to the grievance Johnson filed in 
September 2009 about the pain medication he received in May and June 2009.  Caputo’s 
response to his complaint does not demonstrate her actual knowledge of his pain at the 
time that he was experiencing it.  Johnson cannot show that Caputo possessed the 
requisite personal involvement in the provision of his pain medication in May and June 
2009. 
Finally, Johnson’s generalized allegation that defendants Gessner, Wilson, and 
Caputo ignored his medical grievances or failed to schedule outside medical 
appointments has no support in the record.  On the contrary, the record demonstrates that 
Johnson received consistent and attentive medical care from both NCP medical providers 
and external medical providers.6 
 Johnson’s remaining claim is against PrimeCare for failure to train and supervise 
                                              
6  In both the District Court and this appeal, Johnson has argued that his medical records 
were somehow falsified “in an elaborate cover-up scheme.”  See Appellant’s Argument 
in Support of Appeal at ECF p. 5.  Johnson has admitted that he has no way of proving 
this alleged falsification.  More importantly, he does not explain how it is relevant to his 
claims against these defendants.  Even if the record contains discrepancies, those 
discrepancies do not demonstrate how any defendant was deliberately indifferent to 
Johnson’s serious medical needs. 
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its employees.  Johnson can only hold PrimeCare liable for his alleged constitutional 
violations if he can “provide evidence that there was a relevant [PrimeCare] policy or 
custom” that “caused the constitutional violation[s].”  See Natale, 318 F.3d at 583-84.  
Johnson has not identified any such policy or custom.  He has not explained what training 
or supervision PrimeCare failed to provide.  His only argument relies on his unsupported 
belief that defendants intentionally falsified his records to justify the medical diagnoses 
and care that he received.  Such conclusory allegations are insufficient to survive 
summary judgment.  See Ramara, 814 F.3d at 666.  We will therefore affirm the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of all defendants. 
 
